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Lightning Strikes, Twice 
In the January 2016 issue of the journal Climate Change a research team headed at the 
University of Alberta published the results of an extensive study of wildfire trends in Canada. 
Future climate change, they predicted, `may have a profound and immediate impact on 
wildland fire activity’.1 Just months later, following record warm temperatures and a snow-
light winter, a massive blaze broke in Alberta.  Spreading across 1,500,000 acres, the fires 
prompted the evacuation 88,000 people and caused enough damage to make it the most 
expensive disaster in Canadian history. Worst hit, with the loss of 2,400 homes and buildings, 
was Fort McMurray - the booming service centre for the mining of the Athabasca oil sands.  
 
Critical commentators were quick to link oil sand extraction with climate change and the 
wildfire irruption.  Such a connection is what is referred to in technical terms as a positive 
feedback loop: a situation in which an effect or outcome cycles back through a system in a 
way that reinforces the original driving force.  But so too did the wildfires generate self-
amplifying feedbacks of their own. Some of the most fearsome images of the disaster show 
towering, pyrocumulus clouds rising above the blaze.  From these roiling, ash-laden clouds 
came forks of lightning arcing into as yet unburned forest - advancing the fire front still 
further and faster.2  
 
From another continent, half a millennium ago comes an equally disturbing scene of lightning 
doing its incendiary work.  One of the most dramatic images from Zurich’s Wickiana 
collection is brightly coloured woodcut dated 15 June, 1571: a depiction of dark, billowing 
clouds from which shoot fiery shafts of lightning that are in the process of setting a church 
alight.3  As a shocked onlooker rushes to the scene, a cutaway perspective show us tongues of 
flame descending on the altar and licking at the icons that grace the chapel’s interior. 
 
But here too, unbeknownst to the illustrator, a positive feedback loop may have been in play. 
For in 16th century Switzerland, there were cases when congregations who had seen their 
places of worship consumed by flames set about replacing flammable timber roofs with metal 
ones, a fire safety measure that unintentionally rendered churches even more effective 
conductors of lightning. Though in a time of religious turmoil, worshippers who witnessed 
bolts from the heavens targeting god’s own house would have more likely imagined that it 
was some manner of moral offence or violation that had incited divine retribution.  
 
Our own era, which once more has wondering what we have done to upset the natural order, 
may not be as far from the 16th century as we tend to assume. With his installation of a 
lighting conductor and earthing wire in the gallery space, Swiss artist Florian Germann 
suggests a current arcing between the domain of science and the world of myth and 
imagination, a subtle but surging flow that might also bridge our climate-jittery present with 
the equally uncertain worlds at the dawn of European modernity.   With his fondness for 
tracing shadowy emanations and transformations of energy, we might see Germann as a kind 
of spirit guide to our currently fraught relationship with atmosphere, climate, and the Earth.  
But the materials he uses also remind us of Germann’s ongoing fascination with a grittier 
minerality - the `riches that can be extracted in pure form from the depths of the mountains, 
such as iron, lead, copper, zinc . . . ’4  In this way the installation functions as a kind of 
`earthing’, drawing us back not just to solid ground, but to the shifting, faulting, thrusting 
forces of the Earth’s interior.  
 
We might see Germann’s lightning conductor as setting up a kind of feedback loop between 
Earth and heaven, or as geoscientists would have it, between the hard rock of geology and the 
more mobile flows of the Earth system.  Today, the scientific understanding of our global 
environmental predicament discloses a new and unprecedented human impact at the scale of 
the whole Earth, the gleaning that our species is becoming a geological agent.5 Though we 
might be bemused by the 16th century naivety of cladding lightning-prone structures in highly 
conductive metals, we denizens of the 21st century can hardly afford to be smug. For with our 
blazing wildfires, our melting permafrost, our gradual replacement of solar-reflecting icecaps 
with solar-absorbing ocean or rock, we are the progenitors of feedback loops that make small 
fry of fiery churches.  
 
As we struggle to come to terms with this newfound sense of our geophysical agency, the 
search is on for some way to break out of the planet-scaled feedbacks we have set in motion. 
But we also find ourselves looking backward, trying to ascertain that moment when our 
geological powers first took hold. Just as we used to ask `when and where did we become 
modern?’, now we also ask `when and how did humans begin to leave an imprint on the Earth 
system?’.  While the most obvious candidate is the period of EuroAtlantic history that saw a 
great proliferation of fossil-fuelled machinery, researchers are increasingly turning to an 
earlier moment that provided the preconditions for European take-off.  As social historian 
turned climate historian John Brookes assays the evidence: `the epoch between the Black 
Death and the onset of Industrial revolution was the fundamental hinge of human history’.6  
And this way, we pick up on Germann’s pursuit of elemental resonances through history, 




The Little Ice Age 
At first glance, Brookes’ chosen `hinge of history’ seems like unpromising soil for 
propagating a new planet, especially if our gaze lingers at the grassroots level. Decimated by 
successive waves of plague, Europe in the 14th to 15th centuries was also exiting a period of 
relative warmth and bounteous harvests – sometimes referred to as Medieval Warm Period - 
and entering into a five century bout of cooler, more erratic weather.  As glaciologist Jean 
Grove points out, the term that has been deployed since the 1930s to describe these less 
clement conditions is the Little Ice Age.7 A series of climatic fluctuation more than a simple 
cold spell, the Little Ice Age was a mere wobble next to the vicious see-sawing between 
glacial and interglacial epochs across the two million years of the Pleistocene that our distant 
ancestors endured. But in an agrarian world, a climatic shimmy can suffice to push already 
precarious patterns of subsistence out of balance.  
 
Even in times of plenty, recounts historian Fernand Braudel, the staple foodstuff of the 
European peasantry consisted largely of `insipid farinaceous gruels’.8 From the 14th to the 
early 19th century, growing seasons in temperate Europe retracted and harvests faltered.  With 
successive episodes of crop failure and livestock epidemics, and in the absence of 
infrastructure to move grain and other foodstuffs in sufficient quantities from one place to 
another, came the resurgence of the illnesses associated with hunger.  Environmental 
scientists Siegfried Fred Singer and Dennis Avery paint a picture of a daily existence of 
relentless physical labor performed in muddy fields wearing rain-sodden clothing, followed 
by a return home to an overcrowded, insufficiently heated shelter.  As they put it: `a typical 
North European dwelling had one small room, a bare earth floor, no insulation, no glass in 
any windows and leaky thatched roof’.9 Here, `malnourished people huddled together …to 
share their meager fires and body warmth’.10 So too, in such close and unsanitary quarters, 
did they share their parasites and pathogens.   
 
It was Europe’s highlands and Alps that felt the chill bite of the Little Ice Age most acutely.  
By the latter 18th century, the interplay of mountain formations and glaciation would provide 
an archive of Earth history that fascinated some of the earliest geoscientists, while the surging 
and plunging of great rivers of ice would send shivers of fearful delight through the 
sensorium of travelling aesthetes.  But for many of those living and working in alpine Europe, 
mobile glaciers brought economic ruin and physical destruction.  As Grove recounts:  
 
In the decades between the late sixteenth and late seventeenth centuries European 
glaciers swelled and their tongues advanced, destroying high farms and damaging 
mountain villages. Streams fed from glaciers flooded more frequently, sometimes 
catastrophically. In many areas this kind of hazard was compounded by landslides 
and avalanches triggered by increased precipitation and the greater glacial activity 
associated with it.11 
 
Although agrarian communities lacked systematic records of changing weather conditions, 
collective memory of the more bountiful conditions of the Medieval Warm Period may 
offered at least a shadowy backcloth against which to mark off the trials of Europe’s Little Ice 
Age. With shorter growing seasons and crop failure came localised food scarcity, price rises 
and bread riots, and with hunger and hardship came fear, social discontent and a flailing for 
explanations. If hoarders and speculators were often held culpable, so too did foreigners, 
vagrants and beggars make for convenient scapegoats.12  Poor harvests and diminished 
fruitfulness tended to be read as signs of divine disfavor, lending weight to the idea that 
periods of climatic stress correlated with waves of persecution of so-called witches. As 
Johann Linden, a church canon from Treves put it in 1590:  `Everyone thought the continuous 
crop failure was caused by witches from devilish hate, so the whole country stood up for their 
eradication’.13 Famished and fevered imaginations may have been further unhinged by food 
poisoning.  Continuously damp conditions rendered grain susceptible to mold infections, 
including the notorious ergot fungus – now known to cause burning sensations, convulsions 




Sickly, underfed, overwrought, Europe in the 16th century might seem to be plunging 
downward rather than lifting off into the most explosive episode of transformation in human 
history.  For many centuries, and with a range of motives, commentators have sought the 
causes and conditions of what Europeans came to call their `modernity’. Well before systems 
theorists codified the idea of feedback loops, prescient thinkers had intuited a certain self-
augmenting circularity at the core of the modern condition. Hegel saw enlightened self-
understanding spiraling into a world-changing ascent of reason, Marx explored the self-
amplifying circuit of capital reinvestment, Weber showed how the quest for `other-worldly’ 
elevation entered into a mutually amplifying relationship with the `worldly’ pursuit of 
economic success.  
 In our own era, theorists have become less inclined to look to intrinsic features of European 
culture or society as the impetus for its `take-off’, and more willing to consider Europe’s 
achievements in the context of mutual relations of encounter, exchange and 
interconnectedness with the rest of the world. Philosopher Peter Sloterdijk draws our attention 
to a new kind of feedback loop with a global reach.  By the 16th century, he proposes, 
European navigators, adventurers and traders had broken out of their terrestrial bounds and 
woven the world’s waters into a single, unified space.15  As seafaring became increasingly 
entrepreneurial, Sloterdijk argues, funding trans-oceanic voyages emerged as the model of a 
new kind of venture capital that wagered on successful circumnavigation as the way to make 
a literal `return’ on an investment.  In this way, as nautical techniques improved and with the 
development of new financial instruments for dealing with risk and futurity, globality itself 
became the ground of European modernity’s self-augmenting ascendance. 
 
While Sloterdijk may conceive of the entirety of the Earth’s surface as an emergent sphere of 
operations for enterprising Europeans, his is still a planet predominantly constituted through 
the actions and imaginings of (certain) humans rather than being a force or agent in its own 
right.  But just as humanities scholars have come to think of the globe in terms of its 
unification and interconnectedness, so too have Earth scientists come to conceive of the 
planet as single integrated system. Over the last few decades, Earth systems thinkers and 
other geoscientists have arrived at understanding of the operations of our astronomical body 
in terms of both its openness to the cosmos and its own internal dynamics. Construed as 
vastly complex system composed of jostling, mobile, mutually interacting subsystems, the 
Earth displays variability at every spatial and temporal scale.16  And it is such a vision of the 
Earth as a dynamically interconnected system with a multiple possible operating states that 
helps us to understand how global climate can shift out of the warmer, more stable conditions 
of the Medieval Warm Period and into the cooler, more erratic Little Ice Age, how climates 
jump between glacial and interglacial phases, or how our planet makes the still more 
profound transition between geological epochs.  
 
These insights from Earth science into our planet’s turbulent `geohistory’ can also open new 
windows onto different human collectivities and their varying fortunes.  As research into 
climate change generates ever more detailed and extensive data sets, we get a clearer picture 
of the world-wide or `geosynchronous’ footprint of the Medieval Warm Period and the Little 
Ice Age, as we do for other fluctuations in the Earth system.  At the same time, increasingly 
comprehensive climate and Earth system change data throws considerable regional and local 
variations into relief, reminding us that terminology like `ice ages’ are themselves relevant 
only in certain geographical regions or zones.17   
 
Evidence suggests, for example, that what were experienced as the clement, bountiful 
conditions of Medieval Warm Period in temperate Europe were frequently manifest in the 
equatorial latitudes as megadrought – with catastrophic effects on some large-scale agrarian 
civilizations.18  In European history, the collapse of the initially successful late Medieval 
Norse settlements in Greenland has long been linked to the coming of the cooler conditions of 
the Little Ice Age. But it is also important to consider how both Medieval drought and the 
more erratic temperatures of the Little Ice Age may have contributed significantly to the 
ecological, social and physiological susceptibility of local peoples around the world at the 
time of European exploration and colonial advance.19  
 
Anthropologist Julie Cruikshank recounts how early European contact with indigenous 
peoples in the Pacific Northwest during the later stages of the Little Ice Age overlapped with 
rapid glaciation the region. ‘A time of significant geophysical change’, she notes ‘[ . . . ] 
coincided with dramatic social upheaval causing both readjustments and realignments among 
resident peoples and the permanent problem of powerful strangers who came to stay’.20  As 
Brooke suggests, extended drought and famine during the 16th and 17th centuries fragmented 
once powerful West African states – resulting in heightened vulnerability which may have 
facilitated the brutal advance of the slave trade.21  So too is it likely, he adds, that the Little 
Ice Age contributed to an exceptionally intense wave of war, famine and epidemics across 
much of the Eurasian landmass.   
 
An epidemic is itself one of biological life’s most momentous expressions of positive 
feedback. The growing contact between European and Asian populations is known to have 
played a large part in the successive outbreaks of plague in the 13th to 14th centuries.  This 
formation of a single `disease pool’ would itself have dire consequences when European and 
Asian voyagers later made contact with the `epidemiologically naïve’ populations of other 
regions. But it may also have been significant that the generally cooler temperatures of the 
Little Ice Age, though they frequently visited famine-related illness on susceptible European 
peoples, had the advantage of helping suppress recurrent outbreaks of plague.22   
 
In multiple ways that have yet to be fully teased out, Europe’s lurch into self-amplifying 
circuits of accumulation and change is implicated with an Earth system whose rhythms 
emerge out of its own dense arrangement of positive and negative feedback loops.  Some of 
these entanglements framed and conditioned European contact with the peoples of the rest of 
the world, many of whom were – for a variety of social and physical reasons – already in 
motion.  Other factors contributing to the take-off of Europe were more domestic, including 
the turn to higher productivity agro-ecosystems – often premised upon the appropriation and 
enclosure of farmland formerly in the hands of peasant cultivators.  As archaeologist Brian 
Fagan sums up: `The changes came, above all, from self-improvement, from individual 
landowners adapting to cooler weather, more difficult farming conditions, and opportunities 
in the marketplace’.23  
 
In important respects the cooler, more erratic weather between the 14th and 19th centuries can 
be seen as just another one of numerous fluctuations throughout the 10,000 or so years of the 
Holcene epoch.24 To understand how the Little Ice Age is implicated in the momentous shift 
towards human planetary or geophysical agency, we need consider not only how the 
vicissitudes of climate have made a difference, but also to ask about geological elements and 
processes with which different social groups joined forces. And this means digging deeper 
than the flows and circulations of the Earth system.  Or to borrow from the title of one of 




The 16th Century in 3D 
As a hinge between the 16th century and our own climatically precarious era, let us return to 
those ill-fated churches with their less flammable but more conductive metal roofs.  If the 
electronic discharge of the lighting bolt establishes a connection between the Earth’s 
atmosphere and objects on its surface, so too have we seen - with help from Germann  - that it 
forges a less direct link with subsurface.  For the origin of the metals used to sheath roofs - or 
more sensibly, to function as conductors to divert lightning harmlessly into the ground - lies 
in the faulted, folded and stratified formations of the subterranean Earth.  
 
As we have seen, Sloterdijk -  along with most other social theorists of globalization-  focuses 
his inquiries on the rise of western modernity on a set of intensifying horizontal mobilizations 
and interconnectivities.  But the Age of Discovery also had profound vertical dimension.  At 
the same time as Europeans were increasingly travelling outwards, they were also voyaging 
downwards.  ‘While Vasco da Gama, Columbus, and other explorers were finding new sea 
routes’, notes historian John Nef, ‘[. . . ] the Western peoples were again on the lookout for 
minerals’.26  
 
Europe has an ancient history of extracting metals and other minerals, though many mining 
operations were significantly reduced or shut down after the fall of the Roman Empire. 
Increasing demand for metals in the late Medieval economy –for coinage, construction, tools, 
armour and weapons – saw a significant return to mining in Europe, accompanied by growing 
use of coal for smelting ores.27 Already at this time, observes Nef, in ore-rich regions  `mining 
and metallurgy affected every political authority and every kind of country landholder from 
the emperor to the meanest serf’28. By the latter 15th century, stagnation related to the 
decimations of the plague years was over and Central Europe entered into boom years for 
mining silver, copper, iron and other metals - with old mines being reopened and a rush of 
major new mineral discoveries.29  
 
There is evidence of the erratic weather conditions of the Little Ice Age impinging on mining 
operations. In 1595 floodwaters from a tributary of the Rhône that were triggered by 
fluctuating glaciation inundated newly opened silver mines in the Val de Bagnes.30 But in 
general, successive advances in technology afforded miners more control over subsurface 
operations than their farming counterparts enjoyed on the Earth’s surface, while mineral 
extraction provided vital resource and income streams that largely persisted through climatic 
instability.  In the mid 15th century new processes enabled silver to be separated from copper, 
at the same time that advances in pumping and drainage reduced the problem of flooding – 
permitting mining operations to plumb unprecedented depths.31  One of the first `open source’ 
textbooks, Georgius Agricola’s De Re Metallica  - published in 1556 - was at once a 
compendium of mining and metallurgical knowledge and a spirited defense of the social and 
economic benefits of intensifying interchange with the metallogenic subsurface.32 
 
There has been a great deal of attention to the technological advances – from map-making 
and sailing ship construction, through to compasses and chronometers – that facilitated trans-
oceanic navigation.  What Agricola’s richly illustrated volume foregrounds is the 
contemporaneous importance of advances in navigating through the Earth.  Here, as a case in 
point, he describes in detail one set of techniques deployed by mining experts to negotiate, 
gauge and map the three dimensional spaces intrinsic to the successful extraction of mineral 
resources:  
 
The Swiss surveyors, when they wish to measure tunnels driven into the 
highest mountains [ . . . ]employ an instrument peculiar to them which has a 
needle [ . . . ]they carry in their hands a chart on which they inscribe the 
readings of the instrument. The instrument is placed is placed on the back part 
of the rod so that the tongue, and the extended cord which runs through the 
three holes of the tongue, demonstrates the direction, and they note the 
number of fathoms [ . . . ] They measure the tunnels for the purpose of 
knowing how many fathoms they have been increased in elevation; how many 
fathoms the lower is distant from the upper one; how many fathoms of interval 
is not yet pierced by the miners who on opposite sides are digging on the same 
vein [ . . . ] or two veins which are approaching one another.33  
 
Just as the mercantile voyages of early modernity – as they pressed further outwards -
embodied a new kind of literal `return’ on investment, so too was mining – as it pressed 
downwards - the stimulus for new ways of financing and organizing production.  During the 
Central European mining boom, Braudel recounts, escalating financial requirements of 
equipment needed to access ever-deeper ores enabled absentee investors to gain control over 
mining. ‘Capitalism’, he proclaims, ‘entered a new and decisive stage’.34  Or as cultural 
historian Lewis Mumford puts it:  ‘more closely than any other industry, mining was bound 
up with the first development of modern capitalism’, before adding that by the 16th century it 
was also the occasion for ‘the use of the strike as a weapon of defense, the bitter class war, 
and finally the extinction of the guilds’ power’.35  
 
If this regard, mining in Europe in the 15th - 16th centuries helped generate a new set of 
relations – both between different social groups and between humankind and the Earth. Like 
the discovery of new worlds across the ocean, the traversal of the underworld – with its 
seemingly inexhaustible richness – served to open the European imagination to unbounded 
horizons and the idea of limitless accumulation.36 In a more practical way, mining for metallic 
ores helped establish technological pathways that would be crucial for the intensified 
extraction of fossil fuels, it provided raw materials and many of the templates for the 
construction of later industrial machinery, it helped give rise to venture capital oriented to 
large scale, future-oriented projects, and it supplied the precious metallic coinage that 
mediated and promoted market relations  
 
As metallurgical historian Theodore Wertime observes, metals have long served as stimuli 
and accelerants in the social world:   ‘they became catalysts of social life for men, even as 
they had been catalysts of energy exchanges for cells in the biological organism’.37 Viewed in 
its totality, the accelerating traffic between surface and subsurface that literally reached new 
levels in the 16th century can be seen as a key at to Europe’s self-sustaining take-off.  More 
than this, however, it is the very ability to experience and imagine the Earth in three 
dimensions that crystallized during the Central European mining boom which provided the 
formative insights of geological thinking, and in this sense helped open the way to today’s 




From the Deep 16th Century to the Anthropocene 
In laying out the contours of the modern world system, Fernand Braudel spoke of `the long 
16th century’ (c. 1450–1640) in order to explain how capitalism arose from the drawn out 
crises of European feudalism.38   Today, when we find ourselves increasingly thinking about 
the global socio-economic system and the Earth system together, we might think of the 16th 
century as being deep as well as long.  Deep, that is, in the literal sense of its subterranean 
excursions. But deep also in the way that 16th century’s intensifying exchanges with the 
subsurface are implicated in a lasting physical transformation of the Earth - and in the modern 
understanding of our planet as a rich, layered and dynamic entity 
 
While the rise of Earth systems thinking has helped us comprehend how the different 
components of our planet work together to generate variability and change, it is important to 
keep in mind than an older geological science – focused on the rocky strata that comprise the 
Earth’s crust – still plays a vital role in thinking about what our planet did in the past what it 
may do in the future.39  Today, the `stratigraphic’ expertise of geologists reveals how past 
changes in the Earth system left enduring traces in the stony or `lithic’ layering of the outer 
Earth, and provides vital evidence of the way that the more recent human `unearthing’ of 
ancient energy and mineral-rich strata impacts upon the planet as a whole.   
 
Before it became the province of specialized scientific researchers, however, the basic idea 
that the rocky parts of the Earth were built up of a succession of different layers belonged to 
miners, quarrymen and others whose daily work took them beneath the Earth’s surface. 
Surveying several centuries of European extractive labor, geological historian Martin 
Rudwick explains:  
 
Mining provided [ . . . ] not only [ . . . ] empirical data on the dimension 
of depth in the earth’s crust, but also – far more importantly – 
a distinctive way of thinking and even of seeing. Anyone involved 
in the mining industry, from ordinary miners right up the social 
scale to those who managed and administered mines, worked in a 
three-dimensional world of rock structures.40 
 
From plying the subterranean realms came the early evidence of life forms no longer living, 
and the first gleaning that the going deeper into the Earth equated with going backwards in 
time. Eventually, contemplation of the layering of the Earth and the recognition that each 
stratum had its own specific fossil complement gave rise to the idea that the Earth itself must 
have had a long and active history.41 At the same time, observation of glaciers on the move in 
the alpine regions of Europe in the latter stages of the Little Ice Age and a growing interest in 
the processes through which mountains were formed added to the understanding of the 
Earth’s surface as a dynamic expression of deep temporal forces and processes.  
 
It has taken several centuries for geoscientists to arrive at a more systematic understanding of 
the interplay between the enduring geological formations of the Earth and the more variable 
and flowing components of the Earth system.  It is out of this convergence, Earth scientists 
themselves relate, that we are beginning to grasp how collective human activity is nudging 
the Earth system into a novel operating state – otherwise known as the Anthropocene thesis.42 
But just as the long and deep European 16th century engendered some of the earliest stirrings 
of `geological’ knowledge, so too are contemporary insights into the dynamics of the Earth 
system providing novel perspectives on the phenomenon of the Little Ice Age.  
 
Alongside the changes in the Earth’s axis and orbit that are known to produce variation in the 
amount of solar radiation received by our planet’s surface, researchers have proposed that 
exceptional bursts of volcanism are behind the abrupt onset of the Little Ice Age.  After close 
examination of Arctic ice cores, geologist Gifford Miller and his colleagues conclude that 
`intervals of sudden ice growth coincide with two of the most volcanically perturbed half 
centuries of the past millennium’.43 Volcanic explosions, they argue, loaded enough sunlight-
refracting sulphur particles into the stratosphere to reduce temperatures in the global climate 
system, with further cooling resulting from positive feedbacks involving enhanced reflection 
of sunlight from an increased sea-ice cover.    
 
Volcanoes are not the only `geological’ events capable of transforming atmospheric 
composition in ways that alter the amount of sunlight reaching the Earth. It has long been 
known that decimation of indigenous peoples in the Americas and elsewhere through the 
violence of European conquest and outbreaks of disease massively disrupted traditional 
farming based around the use of fire to clear forests.  Although the idea is strongly contested, 
scientists recently proposed that the resultant regrowth of forests was on such a scale that it 
absorbed enough carbon dioxide from the Earth’s atmosphere to impact global climate. 
According to ecologist Simon Lewis and climatologist Mark Maslin, the population crash 
resulting from the collision of Europe and the `new world’ coincided with the coolest phase 
of the Little Ice Age   - from around 1550 to 1650 - and in this sense can be considered to 
have triggered a lasting, worldwide change in global climate.44 
 
So too are we seeing the emergence of novel hypotheses about the waning of the Little Ice 
Age. Climatologists have recently argued that even before the onset of a warmer climatic 
regime, particles of black carbon from coal combustion during the early Industrial Revolution 
had already begun to the blanket Europe’s alpine regions. Both the rise of industrial activity 
around the Alps and the growth of coal-fired rail systems, it is suggested, resulted in 
significant sooty deposits causing snow and ice to absorb more sunlight - to such an extent of 
triggered the retreat of glaciers in Central Europe.45  
 
The current position of leading Anthropocene theorists is that, while potentially significant, 
none of these events is momentous enough to have left a permanent, worldwide signature in 
the rocks – the planetary reformation that would qualify for the arrival of a new post-
Holocene geological epoch.  But the very proliferation of new theories – especially those with 
a pronounced `geosocial’ dimension are indicative of profound shifts in the way we 
understand the interplay of social and geological processes.  And in this way they bring into 
relief the depth and degree of entanglement of the 16th century with our own era.  
 
Illuminated both by the flash of lightning and by the shimmer of mineral strikes, Europe in 
the midst of the Little Ice Age was every bit as adventurous vertically as it was horizontally. 
Or we might say, in the course of long 16th century Europeans achieved a kind of positive 
feedback between their outward and downward traversals of the Earth.  Today, it is the 
runaway, cascading consequences of this intensified traffic between the inner and outer Earth 
that once again has us doubting the surety of our world. Only this time, it is not the advance 
of glaciation that perturbs us but the disappearance of ice, less the failure of harvests from too 
little warmth we fear than the wilting of crops from excessive heat.  And as Jean Grove 
reminded us, across the world it is the impoverished and the marginalised who experience the 
severest exposure to climatic extremity:  `as in Little Ice Age Europe, the poorest suffer most 
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